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ABSTRACT 
The effects of cultural distance and religion on foreign bias in portfolio investment are 
explored in two chapters. In the first part of this paper, evidence of a previously discovered 
curvilinear relationship between national culture and national wealth (GDP/capita) and is 
observed for the first time with aggregate investment data. This research finds GDP/capita to 
be curvilinear with the cultural distance index, and that this curve changes directions 
depending on the economic development of nations, the implication of which is that the 
curvilinear relationship between national culture and national wealth appears much more 
strikingly for developing markets and should be accounted for in investments research that 
includes such nations by including additional controls for economic development. In the 
second part of this paper, theory from culture is used to associate the effects of religion on 
portfolio allocations. Greater religiosity, or the ratio of the number of religious adherents to 
the total population, is found to be negatively associated with portfolio allocations for U.S. 
investment funds. This result follows previous theory and empirical results regarding the risk 
preferences of religious adherents. In addition, greater gambling preferences, as measured by 
the ratio of Catholics to Protestants, is associated with higher foreign portfolio allocations for 
funds. The results for both chapters are obtained with ten years of foreign allocations in 36 
different countries from 475 U.S. investment funds. 
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  1 
PART 1 – FOREIGN BIAS, CULTURAL DISTANCE, AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between economics and national culture is well-established, but the 
relationship between finance and national culture is largely assumed based on similarities 
between economics and finance. This is a fair assumption given the connection between 
economics and finance. But what of the relationship between culture and finance? Other 
research has also found connections between economics and culture. For example, Franke et 
al. (1991) finds that Geert Hofstede’s national cultural dimension of individualism is 
positively related to economic growth between 1965 and 1980. Furthermore, at the individual 
level, Diener and Diener (1995) finds that individualism is positively related with personal 
wealth in a sample of 13,000 people across 31 nations. 
Given these two studies, perhaps the assumption of an association between economics 
and finance with national culture is fair, but there is still value in the empirical validation of 
these similarities. That is the aim of this research. This research establishes empirical 
validation that the curvilinear relationship between national culture and national wealth 
(GDP/capita) found by Tang and Koveos (2008) also applies to national culture and aggregate 
investment data and that this effect is more pronounced for developing nations. The 
implication is that further cross-cultural investments research may need to provide additional 
control variables for economic development differences when such nations are present in the 
sample. 
The setting for this empirical validation is in the relationship between national culture 
and foreign bias in portfolio investment. However, early behavioral finance research about 
investment biases focused instead on “home bias,” the preference investors have in their 
portfolio choices for companies that are located closer to them. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) 
studies the investment preferences of U.S. investment funds, finding that funds prefer 
companies with local headquarters over other companies with headquarters located further 
away. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) observes this phenomenon abroad in Finnish individual 
investors and finds that the effect of distance matters less for experienced investors than for 
inexperienced investors from households. That research also introduces other control 
variables to the study of home bias besides geographic distance, such as language and culture. 
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Though that research is among the first to reference culture in the study of investment biases, 
cultural differences are only defined by cross-national differences between Swedish and 
Finnish investors. However, some of the personality traits found in cross-cultural frameworks, 
such as sociability, are the focus of the later study Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004). That study 
also began to control for other factors that are of interest to researchers creating cross-cultural 
frameworks, such as income, ethnicity, and education. 
As for the bias towards overinvesting in foreign assets, Chan, Covrig, and Ng define 
this “foreign bias” as the weighting of a nation in a portfolio relative to the total portfolio, 
which is then scaled by the stock market capitalization of that nation relative to the 
capitalizations of all the other nations in the portfolio (2005). Chan et al. (2005) uses this 
distinction to separate home bias from foreign bias for measurement. Beugelsdijk and Frijns 
(2010) (henceforth BF) test hypotheses related to Chan et al.’s measure of foreign bias with 
Kogut and Singh’s cultural distance index of Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (2005; 
2001). Kogut and Singh’s cultural distance index is made up of all four of Hofstede’s main 
cultural dimensions: individualism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity/femininity, power 
distance (1988). 
As it relates to foreign bias, people from individualistic cultures have weaker 
relationships with people outside of their family (Hofstede, 2001). BF hypothesizes that such 
weaker relationships could lead to an individual failing to confer with their group about 
decisions, which would then lead to greater risk-taking and therefore overallocations--foreign 
bias (2010). They indeed find that the individualism of home markets of investment has a 
positive effect with foreign host market investment (‘home’ is the nation where the fund is 
domiciled, ‘host’ is the nation receiving investment). The cultural dimension of uncertainty 
avoidance is about perceptions of time, such that cultures with weak uncertainty avoidance 
have people who are more comfortable with uncertainty about the future, whereas cultures 
with strong uncertainty avoidance instill fear about uncertainty into members of their culture 
(Hofstede, 2001). Regarding foreign bias, BF posit that uncertainty avoidance should do with 
how comfortable investors are with risk based on the findings of Kwok and Tadesse, who find 
that nations with higher uncertainty avoidance also tend to have bank-based financial systems 
with more rules and regulations (2006). BF also finds that investment funds from home 
markets with higher uncertainty avoidance scores tend to invest less in non-local host markets. 
The cultural dimensions of individualism and uncertainty avoidance are chosen from 
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Geert Hofstede’s research for study in BF because of their purported bearing on economics 
and on risk, the avoidance of which is one of the primary reasons for portfolio diversification 
(Kirkman, Lowe, and Gibson, 2006; Markowitz, 1952, 1959). However, the cultural distance 
index also includes two other dimensions, masculinity/femininity and power distance. 
Cultures that are more masculine emphasize “assertiveness” and boasting, while more 
feminine cultures emphasize modesty and demureness (Hofstede, 2001; 2011). Male investors 
are found to be overconfident in their investment decisions by Barber and Odean (2001), 
leading to the assumption of a positive relationship dimension with portfolio allocations. For 
power distance, cultures with higher power distance have more sharply defined social 
hierarchy boundaries than cultures with lower power distance (Hofstede, 2001). Such sharply 
defined social boundaries could again lead to the individual failing to confer with the group 
and therefore to greater risk-taking and higher allocations, as with individualism. Kogut and 
Singh indexed the home and host country measures of this dimension along with those of 
masculinity/femininity, individualism, and uncertainty avoidance in their cultural distance 
index of Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (1988, 2010). 
BF associate cultural distance with portfolio investment on the basis that greater 
cultural distance between two countries would result in greater overall differences between 
the four constituent dimensions of the index. This difference leads to greater unfamiliarity 
between the nations, which then leads to less investment. BF suggest that this logic follows 
the findings of Huberman (2001) that investors with a greater familiarity with domestic stocks 
feel greater unfamiliarity with foreign stocks. BF therefore suggest that risk aversion alone 
does not cause lower foreign investment, but also greater cultural unfamiliarity. 
However, BF only finds an effect for this measure on foreign bias after separating their 
sample into two portfolios. These portfolios are defined by the economic development of the 
host nations of investment. After hypothesizing a general negative relationship between 
cultural distance and foreign bias, they instead find a negative and insignificant effect for their 
portfolio of all nations. However, when the sample is split by economic development, they 
find a negative and significant relationship for their portfolio of developed host nations, and 
a positive but insignificant relationship for their portfolio of developing market nations. 
To explain the results, BF offers Kwok and Reeb’s “Upstream-Downstream” theory, 
though the theory is not tested (2000). The original purpose of this theory is to explain the 
direction of FDI from developed to developing market nations and vice-versa. As BF applies 
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this theory to portfolio investment, funds from developed nations invest “downstream” for 
higher returns (with accompanying higher risk) while funds from developing nations invest 
“upstream” for lower risk (with accompanying lower returns). 
This research investigates part of this theory’s ability to explain the relationship 
between foreign bias and cultural distance. To do this, this research uses the same 
methodology from BF with a few changes. The first of these changes is in the sample, which 
is only composed of U.S. funds. Because this study controls for the home country of 
investment with a sample of funds from the U.S., the second change follows: BF studies the 
effects of cultural distance on foreign bias in a model specification which also includes the 
home market’s dimensions of individualism and uncertainty avoidance, and those two cultural 
dimensions are now not required in the specification, allowing for a more parsimonious 
specification that focuses entirely on the cultural distance index. This follows the original 
research on cultural distance by Kogut and Singh, which also controlled for the home country 
of distance by only using the cultural distance of the United States in relation to other countries 
(1988). Furthermore, this focus on cultural distance to the exclusion of other cultural 
dimensions removes any sort of correlative influence whatsoever. A third difference that 
follows from using a sample of U.S. investment funds is that this research also focuses on 
investment to similarly developed nations and investment “downstream” investment to 
developing markets. Ideally, a sample would be balanced to also include investment funds 
from emerging markets that invest “upstream” to developed nations. However, a search in the 
Bloomberg information system for such funds yields a list of only twelve funds. This makes 
finding a balanced and matched sample to test the upstream-downstream hypothesis 
problematic. Therefore, given the difficulties of testing the applicability of the upstream-
downstream hypothesis to foreign portfolio allocations, this research focuses instead on 
“downstream” investment from developed market investment funds (in this case, the U.S.). 
However, the signs of the findings from this research do not fully support those 
predicted by the upstream-downstream theory. Tests, including K-means clustering, indicate 
that a binary classification of economic development is too simple for the sample. Therefore, 
additional economic development control variables are added to the main specification. The 
original study on foreign bias by Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005) uses five variables to control 
for differences in economic development that are not present in the specification used by BF. 
Those variables are added to a new alternate specification. One of these variables is the log 
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of GDP/capita, a variable that is also found to have a curvilinear relationship with the cultural 
dimensions of power distance and individualism. 
Tang and Koveos measure GDP/capita for nations represented in Hofstede’s 
dimensions from 1970-1974 and again from 1990-1994, finding that most nations have 
changed in economic development relative to one another, and that the GDP/capita of these 
nations has a curvilinear relationship with the dimensions of power distance and individualism. 
On that basis, the authors adjust the cultural dimensions for these changes. In terms of the 
sample of this research, of the nations that are present in the sample of Tang and Koveos 
(2008), all but three nations change in their economic development rankings relative to one 
another between 1970-1974 and 1990-1994. However, those three nations (France, Greece, 
and India) have all had their GDP/capita change relative to the other nations between 1990-
1994 and the timespan of this research. Given these relative changes in national wealth over 
this time period, this research expects and finds a similar curvilinear relationship between 
cultural distance and the logarithm of GDP/capita for this sample from 2006-2015.1 In Figure 
1, a polynomial fit to a plot of cultural distance and the log of GDP/capita shows a similar 
curvilinear relationship. Figure 2 shows that this curvilinear relationship existed within the 48 
host nations of investment in the sample of BF as well. A more pronounced curve upwards 
towards the right indicates that some additional non-linearity is present in that sample which 
could explain some of the inconclusive results from the application of a linear tobit analysis. 
To verify that this overall curvilinear relationship exists out-of-sample, cultural 
distance is also calculated and matched with all available GDP/Capita data from the World 
Bank (see Figure 3). 68 nations that have national culture dimensions also have GDP/Capita 
data available, though missing GDP/Capita data in earlier years causes an upwards bias in the 
number of observations towards the present. Despite this, the curvilinear relationship between 
GDP/Capita and cultural dimensions observed by Tang and Koveos is also present for cultural 
distance and is persistent over the past 45 years. Figure 3 shows the mean values of cultural 
distance and the mean of the log of GDP/capita over the two 5-year time periods surveyed by 
Tang and Koveos (1970-1974 and 1990-1994), as well as a comparable five-year time period 
within the panel of this data (2010-2014). Comparable economic development classification 
                                                             
1 Both Chan et al. (2005) and Tang and Koveos (2008) take the logarithm of GDP/capita, but for different reasons. Chan et 
al. (2005) does so to normalize the variable while Tang and Koveos (2008) do so to scale the variable to match Hofstede’s 
dimensions, which are on a percentile scale. 
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data was not available from the World Economic Forum for these three time periods, but 
GDP/Capita increases as the three successive plots shift further to the right, showing the 
increasing wealth of nations. Fitted polynomial curves for each of the three timeframes show 
a curvilinear relationship between cultural distance and national wealth that is gradually 
flattening over time with each curve. Considered together, figures 1 and 2 validate that the 
curvilinear relationship in Figure 3 has not disappeared yet, and that it exists for the cultural 
distance index despite that index containing two cultural dimensions for which Tang and 
Koveos (2008) found no curvilinear relationship with national wealth (masculinity or 
uncertainty avoidance). However, it also shows that this curvilinearity is more pronounced 
out-of-sample than it is in this research or in BF, a difference that is perhaps due to outliers. 
Once the log of GDP/capita is added to the specification, along with four other 
economic development control variables from Chan et al. (2005), the sign for the cultural 
distance coefficient of the developing nation portfolio changes from positive to negative. This 
change simultaneously provides support for the downstream portion of the upstream-
downstream hypothesis and also indicates that this hypothesis may be explaining Tang and 
Koveos’ curvilinearity as well. However, the sign for the coefficient of developed portfolio 
does not change, perhaps due to the steeper slope for developing nations observed in Figure 
1. The sign for developing nations flips once again when cultural dimension scores that have 
been updated by Tang and Koveos for this curvilinear relationship are substituted into the 
cultural distance index, as one might expect when the same curvilinear relationship is being 
controlled for twice, providing additional support for this explanation. Thus, in addition to 
representing the first evidence in the finance literature of this curvilinear relationship between 
culture and national wealth, it appears that the curvilinear nature of culture and economic 
development matters much more for developing nations than it does for developed nations. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
In order to demonstrate these relationships between national wealth and national 
culture for cultural distance, this research draws upon the hypotheses for portfolio allocations 
and cultural distance from BF and alters them to suit the downstream portion of Kwok and 
Reeb’s upstream-downstream hypothesis that is the focus of this U.S. investment fund sample. 
In their sample composed of funds from both developed and developing markets, BF 
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hypothesize finding negative relationships between cultural distance and foreign bias for their 
combined market portfolio and developed market portfolio, and a positive relationship for the 
developing market portfolio (2010). Under the upstream-downstream hypothesis, investors 
from developed markets invest ‘downstream’ to developing nations for greater risk-return, 
and investors from developing markets invest ‘upstream’ to developed nations for lower risk-
return. For this sample of U.S. investment funds, these developed market investment funds 
would invest “downstream” to developing markets and comparably less to similarly 
developed nations, for a negative relationship between foreign bias and cultural distance 
between the U.S. and developed host nations of investment (Kwok and Reeb, 2000).  As such, 
this research expects: 
 
Hypothesis 1a. Higher cultural distance between the U.S. and the host markets of 
investment in the combined market portfolio is associated with in lower foreign portfolio 
allocations. 
 
Hypothesis 1b. Higher cultural distance between the U.S. and the host markets of 
investment in the developed market portfolio is associated with lower foreign portfolio 
allocations. 
 
Hypothesis 1c. Higher cultural distance between the U.S. and the host markets of 
investment in the developing market portfolio is associated with higher foreign portfolio 
allocations. 
 
3. Data 
This research controls for the home market of investment by using a sample of U.S. 
investment funds investing in 36 host markets of investment. The list of U.S. funds was 
compiled using Bloomberg, using the search terms “fund domiciled in the U.S.”, “fund 
managers located in the U.S.”, as well as with a “global geographic focus” and “global 
allocation investment strategy.” This focus and strategy is necessary to improve the external 
validity of the results given the lower-than-average level of foreign bias for the U.S. observed 
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by BF. The full sample contains portfolio weightings from 475 U.S. investment funds from 
Q1-2006 to Q4-2015. After the formation of the fund list, all portfolio weighting and return 
data was collected from Morningstar Direct. The 36 host markets of investment are chosen 
primarily because of the availability of data for market-level control variables, the variables 
of which are selected from BF. 
When the 36 host markets of investment are separated into two portfolios based on 
their economic development, 26 markets are represented in the developed market portfolio 
and ten markets are represented in the developing market portfolio. The separation of these 
markets is based on World Economic Forum data that divides markets into “high-income” 
markets, the highest income category in the income classification, and markets that are 
otherwise. This proportion is approximately similar to that in the sample in BF, which has one 
home market and 12 host markets of investment that are not high-income economies. In this 
research, finding funds with allocations in many developing nations proved to be difficult. In 
addition, data for market-level control variables for many different developing nations was 
not available as well. Despite this, a fair amount of variation for funds from nations of both 
types of economic development is represented in this sample. 
 
4. Methodology 
There are two measures of importance in this analysis. The first is foreign bias, the 
dependent variable that is operationalized in this research in the same manner as in BF and in 
the research from which it originates, Chan et al. (2005). The second measure is the 
independent variable of interest, cultural distance. This variable is operationalized in the same 
manner as BF where it is modified from its original use in Kogut and Singh (1988). 
The foreign bias measure compares the actual level of investment in a market to the 
optimal level of investment in that market, such that values above a one-to-one ratio of these 
levels are deemed to exhibit foreign bias. A logarithm transformation is taken to normalize 
foreign bias because only positive values of foreign bias are of interest for an analysis of over-
investment. This measure is used in this research in the same manner as it is used in Chan et 
al. (2005), Anderson et al. (2010), and BF: 
                                         (1)                                                                																																																												𝐹𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆'( = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 -𝑤'(𝑤(∗0 , 	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑖	 ≠ 𝑗 
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In this sample, i represents the U.S. in all cases since this analysis controls for the 
home country of investment using only U.S.-based investment funds. The numerator of 
foreign bias is represented by wij: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
                  (2) 
which is the ratio of MVj, the percentage portfolio weighting allocated to host market j, to the 
denominator, which is the total amount of investment allocated to the markets in this sample. 
As for the denominator of foreign bias w*j in (3), MVj* is the market capitalization of host 
market j in relation to the denominator, which is the market capitalization of all markets 
invested in by the U.S. funds in the sample: 
     𝑤(∗= 789∗∑ 78;∗<;=>                                                      (3) 
The second measure of consequence in this research is Kogut and Singh’s cultural 
distance index of Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions of individualism, uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity/femininity, and power distance, which is originally expressed in their 
research as (1988): 
                                                                                        (4) 
Where CDj is the cultural distance of market j from the United States. Ikj is the index 
of cultural dimension k for market j, and Iku is the score for cultural dimension k for u, which 
represents the U.S. Vk  is the variance of the index of cultural dimension k. 
However, BF uses a modified version of this index to accommodate multiple countries 
besides the United States. That modified version of the index also uses a Euclidean distance 
measure as well that adds a square root transformation to the measure and removes the 
division by the number of cultural dimensions in the index: 
                                                                                      (5) 
CDij = {(Ikj − Iki )2
k=1
4
∑ /Vk}
𝑤'(= 789∑ 78;9<9=>  
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where cultural distance measures distances between multiple home and host markets, such 
that CDij is the distance between home market i and host market j for cultural dimension k. 
The Euclidean modification is justified by BF due to prior criticisms by Shenkar of the 
implicit assumption of the cultural distance index that gives equal weighting to home and host 
markets (2001). This research uses the original cultural distance measure of Kogut and Singh 
(1988) since it uses only the home market of the U.S., but it also applies a Euclidean measure 
to it, following BF: 
                                                                              (6) 
The model specification for the dependent variable of foreign bias combines it with 
independent variables including cultural distance. That independent variable of interest, 
cultural distance (Cultureuj), is specified along with additional market-level controls within 
the following model specification drawn from BF: 
FBIASuj = f(HBIASu, Cultureuj, Attractivenessj, Regional trade regimej, Risk − return profilej, 
Familiarityuj)                                           (7) 
Where HBIASu is the home bias of the U.S. investment funds towards investing in the 
United States. Following Chan et al. (2005) and BF, this is specified as an independent 
variable in the model specification for foreign bias. The other control variables are drawn 
directly from the model specification of BF: The Attractivenessj variables measure the 
attractiveness of the market, the regional trade regimej variables denote whether the market 
in question is a member of a trade organization, the Risk-return profilej variables denote the 
level of risk present in the fund, and the familiarityuj variables denote whether the fund and 
market hold some similarity such as language or distance. These variables are described in 
table 1. 
The host market attractiveness variables include controls for transaction costs, tax 
rates, host stock market development, host capital controls, and host economic growth rate as 
it is measured by gross domestic product. Transaction costs that are drawn from the research 
of Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (2001), and implicit costs are used because the sample is 
made up of U.S. funds and U.S. explicit transaction costs are declining. Tax levels are 
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obtained from Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) Corporate Tax guides for each of the years 
in the sample. BF posits that the host market’s attractiveness would be negatively related to 
tax levels and transaction costs and that is expected here as well. Stock market development 
is measured as the stock market capitalization for that market’s market for that year divided 
by the GDP of that market for that year, and both capitalization and GDP measures are 
obtained from the World Bank and FRED. Host market capital controls are measured using 
the Heritage Foundation’s economic freedom index, which provides a measure of the capital 
controls of foreign transactions for markets on a scale of 1-100, where markets with higher 
scores have fewer capital restrictions. Host market economic growth is measured as the five-
year lagged average GDP growth rate, where GDP data is found using available Standard & 
Poors data by way of the World Bank. 
The regional trade regime variables include three indicator variables that separate 
markets that are members of the EU, NAFTA, and Asean. In the developed and developing 
market portfolio sorts, these variables were sometimes omitted from the analyses due to lack 
of variation or due to a lack of membership in these trade regimes along the dividing line of 
economic development that sorted these portfolios by developed and developing markets. 
The Risk-return profile variables include the one-year and three-year lagged returns as 
well as the stock market volatility. Unlike the other control variables, these variables vary 
from the risk-return variables used in BF. Like that research, the one-year return is used, but 
unlike that research, the lagged three-year return is used instead of the lagged five-year return. 
This is done to ensure that the sample size remains large enough for robust results given the 
likelihood that funds are liquidated or acquired over longer periods of time. The one-year and 
three-year returns are calculated using monthly return data following BF, the data for which 
is collected from Morningstar Direct. Furthermore, since this research controls for the home 
market of investment, a variable measuring the return correlation between home and host 
market investment funds is not included in this analysis. However, a variable measuring stock 
market volatility differences between home and host markets is included following BF and it 
is measured using volatility data from WRDS and FRED. 
Among the familiarity variables, familiarity (or common language) is an indicator 
variable that denotes whether the host market of investment uses English as a native language. 
Distance is the logarithm of the great-circle distance between the center of the U.S. and the 
center of the host market of investment. Finally, the legal system of the host market of 
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investment is measured using an indicator variable that measures whether the nation uses a 
common law system, which provides greater protections to shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny, 1998). 
The variables in this model specification are analyzed using a left-censored tobit, 
following BF, and as in that research, the left-censored tobit is chosen to account for any 
unobserved bias in the sample resulting from the focus on positive values of foreign bias. This 
counters any selection bias that might occur from this focus following Heckman (1979). For 
the same reason, following BF, for funds with no allocations for a market during a period, the 
observations are kept in the sample but weightings are replaced by .001 which then result in 
negative values of foreign bias that are replaced by zero values in the tobit analysis. 
  
5. Results 
          Table 2 has the descriptive statistics for the variables in the study, including the mean, 
median, and standard deviation. The mean and median levels of foreign bias are provided 
prior to its left-censoring. The negative values denote that positive values of foreign bias are 
anomalous and this follows other studies of foreign bias. The means of the indicator variables 
(medians are 0) indicate the prevalence of these indicators in the sample. 
Table 3 has the summary statistics for the data with average foreign bias, average 
weighting, optimal portfolio weighting, and average cultural distances for all 36 markets. 
Although positive values of foreign bias are the focus on this research, the average foreign 
bias measures for each of the 36 markets across all 10 years in the sample are all negative. 
Except for Finland, the same was true for the host markets of BF. 
In preliminary tobit analysis (Table 4), the signs for the cultural distance coefficients 
are all positive, in sharp contrast to mix of positive and negative signs that are expected 
following the upstream-downstream theory and the results from BF. Since the sign for the 
coefficient for cultural distance in the developing market portfolio is positive, these results 
only partially support the upstream-downstream hypothesis to explain the relationship 
between foreign bias and cultural distance. It is on this basis that additional tests are made to 
discern the effects of economic development differences on foreign bias, as those differences 
are defined along the dividing line of “high income” nations and otherwise as used by the 
World Economic Forum. Three additional tests related to economic development are applied 
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to the data: a hierarchical linear model that allows the slopes of individual foreign bias 
regression lines to randomly vary according to the economic development indicator variable, 
a repeated measures MANOVA, and a time-series K-means clustering algorithm. 
The purpose of the left-censored hierarchical linear model is to determine whether or 
not there is any variation in the individual slopes of the investment fund allocations due to 
economic development differences between the host countries of allocation. The resulting 
analysis does not find any significant variation in foreign bias due to economic development 
differences. The repeated measures MANOVA discerns whether country differences (such as 
that of the stock market capitalization in the denominator of the foreign bias measure), time 
differences over the panel, or economic development differences contribute to the variation 
of foreign bias. The binary measure of economic development differences does not contribute 
any variation whatsoever. Finally, separate time-series K-means cluster analyses with two 
clusters (to find developed and developing markets) and three clusters (to allow for additional 
variation) are conducted using foreign bias and cultural distance values paired together in a 
two-dimensional coordinate system. The within cluster sum-of-squares for the analysis 
(analogous to R2 in linear regression) jumps from 68.6% to 86.8% when three clusters are 
used instead of two clusters. This supports the notion that a binary classification of economic 
development is too simplistic for foreign bias and cultural distance. 
It is on the basis of these tests that additional variables are added to the model 
specification (Table 5). Chan et al. (2005) uses five additional market-level variables to 
control for differences in economic development that are not in BF. These first four of these 
variables are the GDP (%), log of GDP per capita, the trade balance scaled by GDP, and FDI 
scaled by GDP. The data for these variables is all obtained from the World Bank. The final 
economic development control variable concerns the creditworthiness of the country as it is 
measured by the annual country credit ratings published by Institutional Investor magazine. 
Once the additional economic development control variables are added to the 
specification, the signs remain unchanged for all portfolios except the developing market 
portfolio. The sign for the developing market portfolio flips from positive to negative, 
signifying a sensitivity to economic development that goes beyond that of developed market 
nations. This sensitivity is more plainly seen in plots of the relationship between cultural 
distance and GDP/capita, where the fitted curve sharply rises for the developing nations, and 
then slowly curves further downward for the developed nations (see Figure 1). 
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Although Tang and Koveos (2008) does not test for a curvilinear relationship between 
the cultural distance index and GDP/capita, that research updates the scores of the index’s 
four component cultural dimensions to account for curvilinearity with national wealth. The 
first of the robustness tests in panel A of table 6 uses these updated scores in the cultural 
distance index. Given that the revised model specification includes several variables that are 
already scaled by GDP, cultural distance calculated with Tang and Koveos’ updated cultural 
dimension scores would not be expected to demonstrate the predicted signs. In fact, the 
cultural distance results should not be robust to the inclusion of this adjusted cultural 
dimension scores if the curvilinear relationship found by Tang and Koveos (2008) is already 
being controlled for with these new added economic development control variables from 
Chan et al. (2005). Indeed, this is what happens for the developing market portfolio. The sign 
for cultural distance with the developing market portfolio becomes positive, but insignificant, 
once this curvilinear relationship is controlled for a second time. It must be noted that these 
updated scores are not available for all of the nations in the sample and that two developing 
nations and one developed nation are dropped from the analysis for this robustness test. 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Taiwan (respectively) are not present in the sample of 
nations used with scores from Tang and Koveos (2008). However, the alternate specification 
results of table 5 are robust without these nations (combined portfolio: 0.114 , s.e. = 0.002 ; 
developed portfolio: 0.41 , s.e. = 0.002; developing portfolio: -0.017, s.e. = 0.002). 
While these new results provide support for the notion that the curvilinear relationship 
observed by Tang and Koveos (2008) is present in this sample, there does appear to be the 
need for additional economic development control variables besides GDP per capita for the 
effect to appear. Along these lines, a variety of combinations of these five variables are tested 
in the alternate specification. A minimum of three of these variables need to be present for the 
observed change in cultural distance coefficient sign to hold: GDP per capita, the credit 
variable, and at least one other economic control variable needs to be present for the sign of 
cultural distance in the developing market portfolio to change. This suggests that the 
curvilinear relationship between national culture and national wealth that is observed by Tang 
and Koveos (2008) may now go beyond GDP per capita. Figure 4 shows that this curvilinear 
(nearly linear) relationship is also present for the credit ratings of nations. Since Institutional 
investor magazine uses a percentile scale for this variable, and since Chan et al. (2005) did 
not take a logarithm of this variable, no logarithm was taken. Just as in Figure 1 for 
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GDP/capita, the direction of the fitted polynomial curve in Figure 4 also seems to depend on 
the economic development of nations. However, similar plots of cultural distance against the 
other economic development variables yielded no similar relationships. 
This introduces the possibility that the curvilinearity of national culture with indicators 
of national wealth may be progressing beyond GDP/capita. Reasons for this progression are 
beyond the scope of this research, but for the practical purposes of controlling for economic 
development differences in cross-cultural investments research, this finding has some 
importance for studies that include developing market nations or focus on such nations. As to 
whether this curvilinear relationship extends to foreign bias, figures 5 and 6 show three-
dimensional plots of foreign bias, cultural distance, and the economic development indicators 
of either GDP/capita or creditworthiness. These two plots show that the curvilinear 
relationships shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3 extend to foreign bias as well. 
The other robustness tests in table are largely formalities to show that the results for the 
developing market portfolio persist. The next robustness test in Panel A includes a variable in 
the model specification that proxies for institutional quality, which is introduced in BF and 
this research since both studies use home market(s) that are highly-developed economies. The 
purpose for this proxy is to counter any possible omitted variable bias stemming from the 
disregard of differences in institutional quality between the U.S. and host markets of 
investment. This measure uses a five-item principal component made of items for the rule of 
law, public enforcement of the rule of law for shareholders, the level of insider trading, risk 
of expropriation of funds, and financial system efficiency. These items are drawn from La 
Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2008). The sign of cultural distance for the developing 
market portfolio is robust to the inclusion of this variable. 
Home and host market random-effects are also estimated to account for any market 
variation outside of the results. The random effects are estimated across the ten years of the 
panel and the signs of the coefficients do not change though the coefficients lose significance. 
OLS with and without the zero values included (zero-truncation instead of left-censoring at 
zero) is also conducted, as well as OLS with the Heckman adjustment. Again, as with the test 
for institutional quality, the signs and significance remain strong and unchanged, though the 
sample size of the developing market portfolio makes zero-truncated OLS infeasible. This 
robust results for the Heckman adjustment that corrects for any sample selection bias is 
relevant because this sample is composed of global allocation funds that are chosen to counter 
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a lower than average level of foreign bias present in the U.S. (Beugelsdijk and Frijns 2010). 
Probits are also estimated and the signs and significance of cultural distance do not change in 
those models either, though coefficient sizes vary. The developing market probit fails to 
converge for likely the same reasons as the zero-truncated OLS test.  
In addition, due to the simplification of the familiarity (common language) variable 
from BF in this sample of U.S. investment funds, a robustness test that adds the future-time 
reference of the language of the host market (strong or weak) is conducted. This added 
variable controls for differences in how different cultures perceive time (Chen 2013). Strong 
future-time referent languages distinctly denote the times of events while weak future-time 
reference languages do not. Such differences could bear on perceptions of risk if the 
immediacy of risk is more apparent in a language with a strong future-time reference. The 
results are robust to the inclusion of this variable. 
Tang and Koveos (2008) remark that the curvilinear relationship that has developed 
between cultural dimensions and national wealth has occurred in part because of institutional 
changes over the intervening decades. Given the centrality of economic development to this 
new specification, a decomposition of the institutional quality index into its five constituent 
measures is made as well. These results (Panel B) are notable only because both the combined 
market portfolio and the developed market portfolio both have negative coefficients for the 
‘rule of law’ measure; there is a negative relationship between the amount of law and the 
amount of portfolio allocation. The ‘rule of law’ measure is an indication of the amount of 
law in the country as measured by the International Country Risk (ICR) rating agency. 
Finally, following BF, the absolute value of the differences between home and host 
country measures of each of the four major cultural dimension scores (using Hofstede’s scores) 
are measured as well. No discernable pattern emerges except for individualism, which is 
consistently negative across all three portfolios. 
The results of the robustness tests begin to break down for the developing market 
portfolio, likely due to the small sample size of funds with a positive value of foreign bias for 
developing markets. Perhaps it is also because of the comparably fewer number of developing 
markets than developing markets as well. Although the former problem is unique to this 
research since it focuses on a subset of investment funds based on the global allocation fund 
strategy, the latter problem is in common to BF. Despite this limitation, the tobits and some 
robustness tests for the tobits are still significant for that portfolio. This provides additional 
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support that the relationship between cultural distance and national wealth is more 
pronounced for developing nations than it is for developed market economies, and that this 
curvilinearity should be accounted for in cross-cultural investments research. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In summary, this research begins by replicating the methodology of BF as closely as 
possible but with exception made to further explore the less conclusive results for cultural 
distance in that research. A result of these differences is that this research focuses on 
“downstream” investment from the upstream-downstream hypothesis. However, only some 
of the predicted downstream investment results appear when additional variables controlling 
for differences in economic development are added. 
The need for the inclusion of economic development control variables to obtain the 
predicted results not only to partially supports the downstream portion of the upstream-
downstream hypothesis offered by BF, but also references the study on national wealth and 
national culture by Tang and Koveos (2008). Indeed, the results of the robustness tests that 
use the updated cultural dimension scores from that research, where the signs flip when those 
updated scores are included with economic development control variables, supports this 
notion. Considered together, these results suggest that the upstream-downstream hypothesis 
may actually be attempting to explain this curvilinear relationship. However, the upstream-
downstream hypothesis was offered by BF to explain the results for cultural distance, not the 
results for the home market dimensions of individualism and uncertainty avoidance. This is 
perhaps because the cultural distance index includes both of those dimensions, and for both 
host and home countries of investment as well. This results in a more complex relationship 
that makes this curvilinear relationship more pronounced despite the presence of the 
dimensions of masculinity and power distance in the index, dimensions for which Tang and 
Koveos (2008) found no relationship with national wealth. Plots of cultural distance with 
GDP/capita and creditworthiness which mirror those in Tang and Koveos (2008) confirm this 
curvilinear relationship for those two economic development indicators. Therefore, in 
addition to demonstrating evidence for a relationship between cultural distance and foreign 
bias, the results also demonstrate the need for cross-cultural studies in finance with developing 
nations in their sample to properly to control for economic development differences as well. 
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PART 2 – RELIGION AND FOREIGN BIAS IN PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT 
 
7. Introduction 
These are difficult days for managed investment funds. Investment in passive funds 
increased by $692 billion in 2017 while nearly $7 billion flowed out of actively managed 
funds in the same period (Napach, 2017). Actively managed funds have begun to adapt by 
learning more about the innate behavioral biases that affect their teams. In particular, Dennis 
Lynch, head of U.S. growth investing at Morgan Stanley, says that “We all have biases. When 
you're under pressure, it's easy to default to your internal programming. But part of being a 
good decision-maker is being self-aware and understanding why you're making the decisions 
you are… You have to balance the two things: culture and cognitive diversity.” Although 
Lynch says that he prefers giving his fund managers Myers-Briggs and Enneagram 
personality tests, there is a growing literature on behavioral investment biases that can also 
benefit fund managers (Ciolli, 2018). 
That literature aims to explain why irrational portfolio allocations that abound in 
portfolio investment. In theory, rational investors should always diversify their portfolios 
according to a set ratio. This diversification ratio should be set according to the proportion of 
the stock market capitalization of a particular country to the total market capitalization of the 
portfolio. In practice, however, investors continually exhibit irrational preferences towards 
their investment allocations, regularly defying this proportion and the theory behind it by 
overweighting their portfolios in different foreign equities (Markowitz, 1959). 
Such explanations for this irrational portfolio investment initially focused on the more 
prevalent phenomenon of why investors might choose to overweight their portfolios in local 
investments, in what has been termed in the literature as “home bias.” As in this research, 
early research in home bias focused on the investment preferences of U.S. investment funds. 
Coval and Moskowitz (1999) finds that U.S. investment funds prefer companies with 
headquarters local to them over other companies with headquarters located further away, and 
that these preferences are manifested in their portfolio choices. Further evidence was found 
by Huberman (2001) for similar preferences for individual investors instead of investment 
funds. 
Home bias is very common, but far more anomalous and difficult to explain is the 
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contrasting preference towards overinvestment in foreign assets, or “foreign bias,” which is 
the focus of Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005). This study found foreign bias to be anomalous in 
comparison with home bias, which is much more common in portfolio investment. Behavioral 
explanations for foreign bias have since examined the effects of culture on foreign bias in 
both Anderson, Fedenia, Hirschey, and Skiba (2011) and BF. Geert Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions are used in both studies. These dimensions measure the proclivities of different 
national cultures and emerge based on a factor analysis of surveys conducted with over 
100,000 people in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Four primary dimensions emerged from 
this confirmatory factor analysis: individualism/collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, 
masculinity/femininity, and power distance. However, though both Anderson et al. (2010) 
and BF test similar hypotheses relating foreign bias in portfolio investment, only 
individualism/collectivism and uncertainty avoidance are used in both studies. This is perhaps 
due to their purported bearing on economics and on risk, the avoidance of which is one of the 
primary reasons for portfolio diversification (Kirkman, Lowe, and Gibson, 2006). 
The cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance is about perceptions of time, such 
that cultures with weak uncertainty avoidance have people who are more comfortable with 
uncertainty about the future, whereas cultures with strong uncertainty avoidance instill fear 
about uncertainty into members of their culture (Hofstede, 2001). BF posits that uncertainty 
avoidance should do with how comfortable investors are with risk based on the findings of 
Kwok and Tadesse, who find that nations with higher uncertainty avoidance also tend to have 
bank-based financial systems with more rules and regulations (2006). BF finds that 
investment funds from home markets with higher uncertainty avoidance scores tend to invest 
less in non-local host markets, and Anderson et al. (2010) confirms these findings. Regarding 
foreign bias and individualism, people from individualistic cultures have weaker relationships 
with people outside of their family (Hofstede, 2001). BF hypothesizes that such weaker 
relationships could lead to an individual failing to confer with their group about decisions, 
which would then lead to greater risk-taking and then to foreign bias in portfolio investment. 
Both BF and Anderson et al. (2010) indeed find that the individualism of home markets of 
investment has a positive effect with foreign host market investment.  
Though these two studies present cross-cultural behavioral research on the topic of 
culture and foreign bias, there has not been yet any research on the topic of religion and 
foreign bias, nor is there any prior theory associating religion with foreign bias. Yet studies 
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of culture and religion in financial decisions are often grouped or conducted together because 
religion arguably relates to finance in a similarly behavioral context as culture. Therefore, to 
bridge the behavioral research of culture and foreign bias with religion, this research 
associates foreign bias with religion by using the prior theory associating foreign bias with 
individualism/collectivism instead of uncertainty avoidance. This association is made under 
the presumption that religion is more about group cohesion than it is about the perceptions of 
time or comfort with rules and regulations. Although the collectivism portion of the 
individualism/collectivism dimension is not emphasized in either BF or Anderson et al. (2010), 
collectivism is present in the theory of both studies because it is the inverse of individualism. 
Unlike people in individualistic cultures, people in collectivistic cultures have stronger 
relationships with people within their families and with close social groups than with others. 
Therefore, this study inverts the supported hypotheses regarding individualism from both of 
those studies to claim that those from more collectivistic cultures would tend to take fewer 
risks and be less likely to exhibit foreign bias in portfolio investment. It is on the basis of 
religion’s cohesion among adherents this association between collectivism and foreign bias is 
adapted to associate religion and risk preferences in portfolio investment, such that greater 
levels of religious adherence are equated with greater levels of collectivism and hence less 
risk-taking. 
Studies of religion have associated greater levels of religious adherence with less risk-
taking in different contexts. Outside of the finance literature, Miller and Hoffman (1995) finds 
an inverse relationship between risk attitudes and religiosity, or the proportion of church-
going adherents to the total population. Osoba (2003) finds that people with lower risk 
preferences attend church more often (as adherents) than people with higher risk preferences. 
The finance literature has applied these findings to risk-taking in finance as well. Hilary and 
Hui (2009) studies the U.S. county-level effects of religiosity on the risk preferences of firms, 
as such risk preferences are represented by the internal rates of return required by those firms 
to invest in projects. Hilary and Hui find that firms residing in counties with greater religiosity 
have higher risk aversion and prefer higher rates of returns for their projects. 
Although there is no concurrent study in finance of religion and risk-taking in portfolio 
investment, it is on the basis of Hilary and Hui (2009) that this study similarly associates 
higher levels of religiosity with lower levels of risk-taking. Since this association is made 
through prior theory from cross-cultural research on foreign bias, this research also uses a 
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model specification and analyses from such research, that of BF. Like BF, this research uses 
a left-censored tobit to focus on positive values of foreign bias and uses many of the same 
robustness checks. However, this research also adds some of the robustness checks used by 
Hilary and Hui (2009) due to the focus of this study on religion. Therefore, this study extends 
the literature of the behavioral study of investment biases by bringing together the theory of 
religion and risk in finance with pre-existing theory on culture and foreign bias, while 
empirically testing that theory using methodologies developed in research on culture and 
foreign bias in portfolio investment. 
Besides the measure of religiosity, other religion-related measures have been used in 
the finance literature before as well. Kumar (2009) and Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2011) use 
the ratio of Catholics to Protestants, or “CP ratio,” in a given U.S. county as a proxy for 
gambling preferences. This measure is based on differing gambling preferences between these 
denominations, where Catholics have a higher preference for gambling. This measure has 
been used in the past as a proxy for such financial risk-taking activities as the holding of 
lottery-type stocks (Kumar 2009; Kumar et al. 2011) and innovation (Chen, Podolski, Rhee, 
and Veeraraghavan 2014). In the context of the risk-taking behavior of overallocation to 
lottery-type stocks and risk-bearing innovation, a greater level of gambling preferences in a 
county is therefore also associated with greater levels of foreign bias in portfolio investment. 
It is on the basis of this association and that of religiosity that this research studies the effects 
of these two measures on foreign bias. 
 
8. Hypotheses 
The theory for the first hypothesis of this research is drawn from the literature of cross-
cultural behavioral investment biases which associates the cultural dimension of 
individualism/collectivism with foreign bias. BF posits and finds that greater risk-taking 
behavior, as manifested by higher levels of the country-level cultural dimension of 
individualism, is associated with higher portfolio allocations. By its converse, higher levels 
of collectivism are therefore also necessarily associated with lower portfolio allocations. It is 
on the basis of this relationship that this research associates the greater group cohesion of 
collectivism with religiosity and hence higher risk-aversion and lower portfolio allocations. 
Absent culture, Hilary and Hui (2009) use religiosity in a similar manner, using theory from 
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prior research on risk-aversion and religiosity to theorize that religious people are more risk 
averse, and that this pattern of aversion continues to the county-level, such that firms located 
in areas populated by risk averse people would be risk averse as well. They indeed find that 
greater religiosity in a county influences firms residing in that county to have lower 
investment rates. Following that finding, this research expects similar results for risk 
preferences in portfolio investment. In the context of the study of foreign bias, this will 
translate into lower portfolio allocations. As such, this research expects: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Higher religiosity in the county of domicile for funds will be associated 
with lower foreign portfolio allocations for those funds. 
 
Besides an effect from the general level of religious adherents in a given area in 
proportion to the total population, between-denomination variation in risk-preferences 
between Catholics and Protestants has been revealed in previous research (Halek and 
Eisenhauer 2001; Noussair, Trautmann, Van de Kuilen, and Vellekoop 2013). Within the 
finance literature, higher proportions of the ratio of Catholics to Protestants in a given U.S. 
county, or CP ratio, is associated with greater risk-taking behavior in that county (Kumar 2009, 
Kumar et al. 2011). Following the first hypothesis, this greater risk-taking behavior is 
associated with higher portfolio allocations that lead to foreign bias in portfolio investment. 
Therefore, this research expects: 
 
Hypothesis 3. Higher levels of the CP ratio in the county of domicile for funds will be 
associated with higher foreign portfolio allocations for those funds. 
 
9. Data 
 Following Hilary and Hui (2009), this study focuses its sample on the United States 
for the same reasons as that research. The first of these reasons is that this focus permits the 
study of religion and economics with lower heterogeneity among the macro-level control 
variables, introducing less disturbance into the model to more accurately assess the effects of 
religion on the variable of interest. In addition, focusing on the U.S. also permits this study to 
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take advantage of the higher levels of religiosity in that nation. Although the literature of 
behavioral investment biases at the individual investor level makes greater use of data from 
Scandinavian countries because of the availability of data from those nations, Hilary and Hui 
(2009) remarks that such countries have comparably lower levels of religious adherence than 
other economically developed nations, making the U.S. ideal for this study (Iannacone 1998). 
Therefore, this research controls for the home market of investment by using a sample 
of U.S. investment funds investing in 36 host markets of investment. The 36 host markets of 
investment are chosen primarily because of the availability of data for market-level control 
variables, the variables of which are selected from BF to that research’s unique focus on 
foreign bias to the exclusion of home bias. The list of funds was compiled using Bloomberg, 
using the search terms “fund domiciled in the U.S.”, “fund managers located in the U.S.,” 
“global geographic focus” and “global allocation investment strategy.” This focus and 
strategy is necessary to compensate for the lower than average level of foreign bias for the 
U.S. observed by BF. Despite this focus in fund strategy, a wide variety of fund types are in 
the sample following Anderson et al. (2010), including REITs, small cap funds, large cap 
funds, short term bond funds, and other types of funds. The full sample contains monthly 
portfolio weightings from 475 U.S. investment funds from Q1-2006 to Q4-2015. These funds 
are domiciled in 133 counties in 30 states. After the formation of the fund list, all portfolio 
weighting and return data was collected from Morningstar Direct. 
Data for the measures of religiosity and the CP ratio was obtained from the American 
Religious Data Archive (ARDA), which provides data on “Churches and Church Membership” 
for the years 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010. Following Kumar (2009), Hilary and Hui (2009), 
Kumar et al. (2011), and Chen et al. (2014), linear interpolation and extrapolation is used with 
this data for the missing years. This data provides information on the number of Catholic and 
Protestant church-goers, or “adherents,” for 133 counties across the U.S., as well as the 
populations for those counties as measured by the U.S. census bureau. Following the literature 
of behavioral investment biases, the location of an investment fund is defined as the location 
of its headquarters (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Ivković and Weisbenner, 2004). Investment 
fund street addresses were cross-checked between Bloomberg and Morningstar. Nearly two 
dozen discrepancies were found that were resolved by a third data source or the investment 
fund’s web site. As such, there is reasonable assurance that investment funds have not changed 
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addresses during the sample time period, and if any of them have moved, the number is so 
low as to not introduce a significant amount of bias to the results. 
 
10. Methodology 
There are three measures of importance used in this analysis. The first is foreign 
bias, the dependent variable that is operationalized in this research in the same manner as 
from the research from which it originates, Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005). The second 
measure is that of the independent variable of religiosity, which is operationalized in this 
research in the same manner as Hilary and Hui (2009). The final measure is that of the CP 
ratio, or ratio of Catholics to Protestants, which is operationalized in this research in the 
same manner as Kumar (2009). 
The foreign bias measure compares the actual level of investment in a market to the 
optimal level of investment in that market, such that values above a one-to-one ratio of these 
levels are deemed to exhibit foreign bias. A logarithm transformation is taken to normalize 
foreign bias because only positive values of foreign bias are of interest for an analysis of 
over-investment. This measure is used in this research in the same manner as it is used in 
Chan et al. (2005), Anderson et al. (2010), and BF: 
 𝐹𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆?( = logC𝑤'(	 	𝑤(∗⁄ E , 𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑢	 ≠ 𝑗                                  (8) 
In this sample, u represents the U.S. in all cases since this analysis controls for the home 
country of investment using only U.S.-based investment funds, while j is the market 
capitalization of country j for sample i. The of numerator of foreign bias is represented by 
wij:  𝑤'( = 	𝑀𝑉(	 	∑ 𝑀𝑉'(I(JK⁄ (                       (9) 
which is the ratio of MVj, the percentage portfolio weighting allocated to host market j, to 
the denominator, which is the total amount of investment allocated to the markets in this 
sample. The denominator of foreign bias w*j, MVj*, is the proportion of country market 
capitalization j to the sum of market capitalizations j in the sample i: 𝑤(∗ = 	𝑀𝑉(∗	 	∑ 𝑀𝑉'∗I'JK⁄                   (10) 
 As for the second variable of interest in this study, religiosity, this variable is 
constructed following Hilary and Hui (2009). Religiosity is defined as the number of 
religious adherents in a county in proportion to the total population of that county. The third 
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variable of interest, the CP ratio, is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of one if the 
county of fund domicile is majority-Catholic proportional to the number of Protestants in 
the county. The CP ratio takes a value of 0 in 2.3% of the sample, or 20,152 observations 
out of a sample of 1,223,388 fund-portfolio allocations in different nations. Therefore, this 
variable is made into an indicator variable following Kumar (2009), and this transformation 
ensures that the proportional imbalance between CP ratio values above and below one does 
not unduly affect the results of the analysis. This transformation represents a limitation of 
this study, however, since it conforms the coefficient to a binary version of the ratio. 
The model specification for the dependent variable of foreign bias combines it with 
religiosity or religious closeness and several other market-level control variables, all of 
which are drawn from a study of foreign bias, BF. See Table 1 for a description of variables. 
The religious independent variables of interest are specified along with additional market-
level controls within the following model specification, where the religioni variables are the 
measures of religiosity and the CP ratio for each county of domicile i from the U.S. u 
represented in the sample of U.S. investment funds. The variables of which are described in 
brief in table 1: 
 
FBIASuj = f(HBIASu, Religionui, Attractivenessj, Regional trade regimej, Risk − return 
profileu, Familiarityuj)                  (11) 
 
Where HBIASu is the home bias of the U.S. investment funds towards investing in the 
United States, u. Following Chan et al. (2005) and BF, this is specified as an independent 
variable in the model specification for foreign bias. The other control variables are drawn 
directly from the model specification of BF: The Attractivenessj variables measure the 
attractiveness of the host market of investment j, the regional trade regimej variables denote 
whether the host market in question is a member of a trade organization, the Risk-return 
profilej variables denote the level of risk present in the fund, and the familiarityuj variables 
denote whether the fund and market hold some similarity such as language or distance. 
 The host market attractiveness variables include controls for transaction costs, tax 
rates, host stock market development, host capital controls, and host economic growth rate 
as it is measured by gross domestic product. Transaction costs that are drawn from the 
research of Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (2001), and implicit costs are used because the 
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sample is made up of U.S. funds and also because U.S. explicit transaction costs are in 
decline. Tax levels are obtained from Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) Corporate Tax 
guides for each of the years in the sample. Stock market development is measured as the 
stock market capitalization for that market’s market for that year divided by the GDP of that 
market for that year, and both capitalization and GDP measures are obtained from the World 
Bank. In certain cases, such as that of the Taiwanese market, or for certain years for the 
Swedish and Finnish markets, data was collected from the web sites of the relevant stock 
markets as well as the St. Louis Fed’s FRED web site. Host market capital controls are 
measured using the Heritage Foundation’s economic freedom index, which provides a 
measure of the capital controls of foreign transactions for markets on a scale of 1-100, 
where markets with higher scores have fewer capital restrictions. Host market economic 
growth is measured as the five-year lagged average GDP growth rate, where GDP data is 
found using available Standard & Poors data by way of the World Bank. 
 The regional trade regime variables include three dichotomous variables that 
separate nations that are members of the EU, NAFTA, and Asean. The Risk-return profile 
variables include the one-year and three-year lagged returns as well as the stock market 
volatility. Unlike the other control variables, these variables vary from the risk-return 
variables used in BF. Like that research, the one-year return is used, but unlike that research, 
the lagged three-year return is used instead of the lagged five-year return. This is necessary 
given the sample size to ensure that it remains large enough for robust results given the 
likelihood of funds to be liquidated or acquired over longer periods of time. The one-year 
and three-year returns are calculated using monthly return data following BF, the data for 
which is collected from Morningstar Direct. Furthermore, since this research controls for the 
home market of investment, a variable measuring the return correlation between home and 
host market investment funds is not included in this analysis due to the homogeneity that 
results in correlation from controlling for the home country of investment. However, a 
variable measuring stock market volatility differences between home and host markets is 
included following BF and it is measured using volatility data from WRDS and FRED. 
 Among the familiarity variables, familiarity is a dummy variable that denotes 
whether the host market of investment uses English as a native language. Distance is the 
logarithm of the great-circle distance between the center of the U.S. and the center of the 
host market of investment. Finally, the legal system of the host market of investment is 
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measured using a dummy if the nation uses a common law system, which provides greater 
protections to shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny, 1998). This last 
variable is a dummy that indicates whether the host market uses a common law system, 
simplified in this research from the common law variable in BF that matches home and host 
markets with common law systems. 
The variables in this model specification are analyzed using a left-censored tobit, 
following BF, and as in that research, the left-censored tobit is chosen to account for any 
unobserved bias in the sample resulting from focus on positive values of foreign bias, to 
counter any selection bias that might occur from this focus (Heckman 1979). For the same 
reason, following BF, for funds with no allocations for a market during a period, the 
observations are kept in the sample but weightings are replaced by .001. Leverage values are 
calculated for the sample and all but a dozen observations are kept for their individual 
influence on the dependent variable. Variance inflation factors are calculated as well and 
none of the VIF values of the variables indicate any collinearity issues. 
 
11. Results 
Table 6 has the summary statistics for the variables in the analysis, including the mean, 
median, and standard deviation. The distances of the standard deviations from the means 
indicates a good amount of variation in the sample except for the five-year GDP growth rate, 
which may be due in part to comovement between the GDP rates of nations after the sub-
prime mortgage crisis. The table also has the summary statistics for the CP ratio variable 
before its transformation into an indicator variable. Figures 7 and 8 show the average 
religiosity and CP ratio values throughout the U.S. What is immediately apparent from figure 
7 is the prevalence of low average CP ratios in U.S. states despite the class imbalance in that 
variable, likely due to the concentration of funds in states like New York and Connecticut. 
Table 7 has the descriptive statistics for both the states and the host markets in the 
sample. Although positive values of foreign bias are the focus on this research, the average 
foreign bias measures for each of the 36 markets across all 10 years in the sample are all 
negative. Except for Finland, the same was true for the host markets of BF and this is 
representative of the anomalousness of foreign bias. 
The main results of the tobit analysis for the base model without religiosity and the 
models with religious variables are shown in table 8. Following the results of Chan et al. (2005) 
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and BF, home bias is negatively related to foreign bias in portfolio allocations. Transaction 
costs, stock market development, and tax levels are all negatively related with portfolio 
allocations. The result for stock market development seems curious and is perhaps due to the 
presence of several emerging markets in this sample. The same negative signs are observed 
for the regional trade regimes except for NAFTA, which may be due to the membership of 
the U.S. in that regional trade regime. “Familiarity,” the variable taking a value of one if the 
nation speaks English, may be positively signed for the same reason as the NAFTA variable. 
The risk and return variables are significant but have little economic effect. Geographical 
distance is positively signed and economically significant and this is perhaps due in part to 
the sample of global allocation funds that are chosen to counter the lower levels of foreign 
bias observed in the U.S. by BF. The same signs and significance levels for these control 
variables are present in both the model specification for religiosity and that of the CP ratio, 
though coefficient magnitudes vary between the specifications.  
Finally, religiosity is both negatively related to foreign bias and economically 
significant, while the CP ratio is positively related to foreign bias and is economically 
significant, supporting both hypotheses of this research. Within this sample of funds, greater 
levels of religiosity in a county influences the risk preferences of investment funds domiciled 
in those counties to lower foreign portfolio allocations, and greater levels of the CP ratio in a 
county influences the risk preferences of investment funds domiciled in those counties to raise 
their foreign portfolio allocations. Both results follow the literature of risk and religiosity in 
the finance literature and outside of it, whereby greater religiosity is associated with a lower 
risk tolerance and higher levels of the CP ratio are associated with greater risk-taking. 
The robustness tests mostly provide additional support for these results (see table 9). In 
particular, both the coefficients of the different OLS analyses as well as the coefficient found 
using clustered standard errors follow the main results, with the results of the clustered 
standard errors being most telling of the robustness of these results. These standard errors are 
clustered according to U.S. state, and with thirty-three different states being represented in 
the sample, these errors therefore absorb a considerable amount of the variance apportioned 
to the coefficient estimates. Despite this, the religiosity and CP ratio coefficients that are 
estimated using clustered standard errors remain significant. However, the fixed effects 
coefficients for both measures are insignificant. The fixed effects test is drawn from BF, and 
perhaps fixed effects are more appropriate for that study than for religion since both county 
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and country variation are of concern in this study. This difference perhaps makes the fixed-
effects assumption of uncorrelation between the variables too excessive for this sample (2010). 
As for the other robustness tests, like the model specification for the tobits, they are 
mostly also drawn from BF. However, some of the tests from that research are omitted here 
due to this research’s controlling for the home market of investment. For this reason, and due 
to the focus in this study, robustness tests from Hilary and Hui’s study of religiosity and 
finance are added to this research (2009). Three new tests are added as well. All of these other 
robustness tests either include additional control variables or use different analytic methods 
other than the tobit. 
The first of these other robustness tests includes a variable in the model specification 
that proxies for institutional quality, which is added since the home market of investment, the 
U.S., is a highly-developed economy. The purpose for this proxy is to counter any possible 
omitted variable bias stemming from the disregard of differences in institutional quality 
between the U.S. and host markets of investment. For this test, BF uses a five-item principal 
component made of items for the rule of law, public enforcement of the rule of law for 
shareholders, the level of insider trading, risk of expropriation of funds, and financial system 
efficiency. These items are drawn from La Porta et al. (2007) and Djankov et al. (2008). Since 
it is impossible to recreate a principal component, this research instead creates an indexed 
measure of these five items from those studies. The result for religiosity remains robust to the 
inclusion of this measure but the result for the CP ratio does not. The results for the CP ratio 
are weaker overall in the robustness tests, no doubt due to the indicator nature of the variable 
and the extreme class imbalance of the variable that will not withstand robustness tests as 
easily as religiosity. 
As for the other robustness tests, OLS tests with and without the zero values included 
(zero-truncation instead of left-censoring at zero) are also conducted, as well as OLS with the 
Heckman adjustment to counter any potential sample selection bias. The robust result for the 
Heckman adjustment with the religiosity result is relevant because this sample is composed 
of global allocation funds that are chosen to counter a lower than average level of foreign bias 
present in the U.S. that was observed by BF. The sign and significance remain unchanged for 
both measures with the Heckman test. A probit is also estimated and the sign and significance 
of religiosity changes, signaling that the main results for religiosity rely more upon the 
variation in positive values of foreign bias than upon the proportion of positive values of 
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foreign bias to left-censored values. This reliance on variation within the dependent variable 
makes the religious decomposition robustness tests of greater interest and importance. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the proportional class imbalance of the CP ratio, the probit 
results for this variable are not significant. 
In addition, due to the simplification of the familiarity (common language) variable 
from BF in this sample of U.S. investment funds, a robustness test that adds the future-time 
reference of the language of the host market is conducted. This variable takes a dichotomous 
form denoting a match between the strong or weak future-time reference of the U.S.’s main 
language of English (strong) and the future-time reference of the country of investment’s 
native language. Strong future-time referent languages distinctly denote the times of events 
while weak future-time reference languages do not. Such differences could bear on 
perceptions of risk if the immediacy of risk is more apparent in a language with a strong 
future-time reference. This variable controls for differences in how different cultures perceive 
time, and the results are robust to the inclusion of this variable (Chen 2013). 
In addition to language, because religiosity is associated with risk-taking and portfolio 
allocations following prior theory associating the cultural dimension of 
individualism/collectivism and portfolio allocations, a state-level measure of collectivism 
from Vandello and Cohen (1999) is used to control for any effects of this cultural dimension. 
Their research finds state-level collectivism scores in all 50 states on a percentile scale. This 
measure is used to isolate any effects due to differences in collectivism across states from the 
effects of religiosity on risk-taking in portfolio allocations. The results for religiosity and the 
CP ratio are both robust against the inclusion of this variable, though it should be noted that 
the highest-individualism northern midwestern states are absent from the sample. Finally, to 
complement that test, another test is conducted that includes the cultural distance index of 
Kogut and Singh (1988). This index measures the difference between the U.S. and the nation 
of investment on all four of Hofstede’s main cultural dimensions, and the results are robust to 
the inclusion of this variable as well. 
Because this study of foreign bias concerns religion, some robustness tests have also 
been drawn from that stream of literature from Hilary and Hui (2009). The first of these tests 
uses a sub-sample of western states, a test conducted due to the “geographical homogeneity 
and religious heterogeneity” of the region. Though Hilary and Hui (2009) uses seven states in 
their western state sub-sample (Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and 
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Washington), only four of those states are present in this sample. Though the signs of both 
coefficients remain unchanged, neither is statistically significant, likely due to the smaller 
representation of western states in this sample. 
The next test is reserved only for the measure of religiosity and considers differences 
between religious denominations. Two variables are separated from the religiosity variable: 
one ratio of Protestants to the total county population, and one ratio of Catholics to the total 
county population. The coefficient for Protestants is positive though barely significant (p < .1), 
weakly countering the results of Hilary and Hui (2009) for corporate risk aversion but 
supporting the association Weber makes between “the Protestant work ethic and growth” 
mindset, at least as growth applies to increased portfolio allocations (Iannaccone, 1998). For 
Catholics, however, this test is negative and significant. This result is contrary to theory that 
Catholics are risk-tolerant, at least for portfolio investment (Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and 
Shapiro 1997). The conflicting signs for both of the religiosity decomposition tests may also 
an alternative explanation for the relative weakness of the robustness tests for the CP ratio 
besides the class imbalance in that variable. 
Such an explanation would indicate the possibility the within-denomination risk 
tolerances, at least as they regard portfolio investment, have been changing to counter what 
prior theory on risk would suggest. A similar effect has been observed in culture, where a 
curvilinear relationship between national wealth (GDP/capita) and national culture has been 
observed to have occurred in the intervening decades between the original measurements of 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and the present (Tang and Koveos, 2008). Another possibility 
is that the risk preferences of Catholics and/or Protestants are multidimensional and apply 
differently to portfolio investment than to other financial transactions, such as the IRR rate of 
capital investment projects studied in Hilary and Hui (2009). Indeed, Halek and Eisenhauer’s 
study of risk aversion and insurance, which calculates Arrow-Pratt coefficients for differing 
types of risk aversion and religions, finds that Catholics are risk averse (2001). Unfortunately, 
due to data limitations, similar Arrow-Pratt calculations are not possible in this research. 
In summary, although it seems that there seems to be an effect of religiosity on portfolio 
allocations, the variation of the dichotomous variable for the CP ratio may not be enough to 
capture the exact magnitude of that relationship. Despite this, the positive results for several 
of the robustness tests indicate an effect. If these signs of the religiosity decomposition tests 
are accepted, however, they provide an alternative reason for the CP ratio results and also 
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contradict prior theory on the risk preferences of Catholics. For the reasons mentioned above, 
this change in risk preference is entirely plausible, though the reasons for such a change are 
beyond the scope of this study. 
 
12. Conclusions 
The presence of foreign bias in portfolio investment is an anomaly compared with 
home bias, and explanations for this bias have begun to emerge in the literature. By associating 
prior theory linking culture to foreign bias with religion and substantiating that association  
with other research on religion and risk-taking in finance from Hilary and Hui (2009), this 
study has been able to make tentative connections between religion and foreign bias in 
portfolio investment that have received empirical support in the course of hypothesis testing. 
As with any study, however, as many questions are raised in the process of this testing as are 
resolved. 
In particular, the decomposition of the religiosity variable into ratios of Catholics or 
Protestants to total population revealed interesting relationships that contradict prior findings 
on the risk tolerances of each denomination. It is simple to explain away these results as effects 
of risk tolerance differences for portfolio allocation, but further examination is warranted by 
these results. Though the reason for this relationship is beyond the scope of this research, it 
indicates that there is research yet to be conducted on the effects of religion on finance. Aside 
from that question, there is the matter of the magnitude of the effect of a positive CP ratio on 
portfolio allocations. Although a positive effect was found, the proportional class imbalance 
in this sample made it necessary to use a dichotomous version of this measure that removed 
the variation that would have given a more accurate estimate of the exact magnitude of that 
effect. 
Otherwise, the results of this research indicate the religion does indeed have an effect 
on portfolio allocations. For managed investment funds, an awareness of the potential of 
religion to affect the investment decisions could be an important factor in adjusting allocations 
to remove its influence. Such adjustments, as they continue to be suggested by the literature 
in this area, will continue to refine the investment strategies of managed funds to give them 
an advantage over their passive competitors in the form of the “self-awareness” that Morgan 
Stanley’s Dennis Lynch refers to in his interview. Perhaps capital will then begin to flow away 
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from comparably “unaware” passive investment funds back towards managed funds. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A - Table 1. Variable Descriptions for part 1 and 2 
 Source Description 
Foreign Bias 
Morningstar 
Direct 
log-difference in weighting of country in proportion to 
portfolio vs. market capitalization of country in proportion 
to market capitalization of portfolio 
   
Home Bias 
Morningstar 
Direct 
log-difference in weighting of the U.S. in proportion to 
portfolio vs. market capitalization of U.S. in proportion to 
market capitalization of portfolio 
   
Transaction Costs 
Djankov et al. 
(2008) 
Implicit transaction costs for the host country of investment 
   
Capital Controls 
Heritage 
Foundation 
Economic freedom index 
   
Market Development World Bank Stock market capitalization/GDP growth rate 
   
Tax Levels PWC Tax Tables Highest-bracket corporate tax rate 
   
GDP Growth World Bank Five-year average GDP rate of change 
   
EU indicator  
Binary variable that takes a value of one if the country is a 
member of the EU, zero otherwise 
   
NAFTA indicator  
Binary variable that takes a value of one if the country is a 
member of NAFTA, zero otherwise 
   
Asean indicator  
Binary variable that takes a value of one if the country is a 
member of ASEAN, zero otherwise 
   
Stock Market Volatility St. Louis FRED Volatility of the stock market for the past year 
   
Common Language  
Binary variable that takes a value of one if the country 
speaks English as its main language 
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Appendix A – Table 1. (cont.) Variable Descriptions for parts 1 and 2 
 Source Description 
Common Law 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Binary variable that takes a value of one if the country has a 
common law system, zero otherwise 
Geographic Distance  
Log of the great-circle distance between the center of the 
U.S. and the center of the host investment country in 
kilometers 
One-year return St. Louis FRED 
Lagged one-year average return calculated using monthly 
data 
Three-year return St. Louis FRED 
Lagged three-year average return calculated using monthly 
data 
   
Cultural Distance 
Kogut and Singh 
(1988) 
Mahalanobis cultural distance between the U.S. and the 
host country of investment 
Religiosity ARDA 
Ratio of adherents to the population for the U.S. county 
where the investment fund is domiciled. 
 
CP Ratio ARDA 
Ratio of Catholics to Protestants for the U.S. county where 
the investment fund is domiciled. 
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Appendix B - Table 2. Summary Statistics of parts 1 and 2 
 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Standard Deviation 
 
Foreign Bias -1.51 -1.33 1.1 
Home Bias 0.222 0.258 0.161 
Transaction Costs 24 15.4 24.4 
Capital Controls 69.8 70.2 9.15 
Market Development 1.011 0.67 1.60 
Tax Levels 26.08 27.5 6.73 
GDP Growth 2.437 2.34 2.33 
EU indicator 0.444 0 0.497 
NAFTA indicator 0.056 0 0.229 
Asean indicator 0.083 0 0.276 
Stock Market Volatility 33.3 9.48 105.1 
Common Language 0.167 0 0.373 
Common Law 0.278 0 0.448 
Lag one-year return 7.61 7.50 17.7 
Lag three-year return 27 25.5 33.8 
Cultural Distance 2.45 2.59 1.01 
Religiosity 0.58 0.57 0.14 
CP Ratio 16.56 15.24 14.58 
 
  
  37 
Appendix C - Table 3. Descriptive statistics for host markets in Part 1 
 
 
Optimal 
Weights 
Avg. 
Allocation 
Avg. Foreign Bias 
Cultural Distance 
from U.S. to host 
Argentina* 0.10 0.02 -1.14 2.42 
Australia 2.59 0.99 -0.56 0.23 
Austria            0.26 0.09 -0.52 2.33 
Belgium 0.63 0.17 -0.72 2.36 
Brazil* 2.36 0.58 -0.69 2.81 
Canada 3.97 2.01 -0.37 0.69 
Colombia* 0.35 0.01 -1.92 3.53 
Czech Republic 0.11 0.02 -0.86 1.89 
Denmark 0.48 0.22 -0.54 2.87 
Finland 0.41 0.21 -0.32 2.28 
France 4.23 1.70 -0.47 2.41 
Germany 3.23 1.29 -0.49 1.24 
Greece* 0.21 0.06 -0.67 3.55 
Hong Kong 4.87 0.81 -0.84 2.95 
Hungary* 0.06 0.01 -0.79 2.06 
India* 2.59 0.24 -1.14 2.40 
Ireland 0.23 0.20 -0.24 1.12 
Italy 1.36 0.48 -0.54 1.44 
Japan 8.17 2.79 -0.53 3.15 
Malaysia* 0.78 0.07 -1.19 3.92 
Mexico* 0.89 0.23 -0.67 3.36 
Netherlands 1.42 0.63 -0.43 2.60 
New Zealand 0.10 0.04 -0.65 0.97 
Norway 0.53 0.36 -0.22 3.02 
Philippines* 0.33 0.06 -0.93 3.36 
Portugal 0.17 0.03 -0.84 3.92 
Singapore 1.16 0.40 -0.59 3.58 
South Africa* 1.67 0.20 -1.03 1.09 
South Korea 2.10 0.35 -0.84 3.57 
Spain 2.52 0.39 -0.77 2.59 
Sweden 1.05 0.44 -0.45 3.22 
Switzerland 2.55 1.33 -0.32 1.13 
Taiwan 1.11 0.32 -0.08 3.25 
 * non-“high income” countries as defined by the World Economic Forum 
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Appendix C - Table 3. (cont.) Descriptive statistics for host markets in Part 1 
 
 
Optimal 
Weights 
Avg. 
Allocation 
Avg. Foreign Bias 
Cultural Distance 
from U.S. to host 
Thailand* 0.56 0.07 -0.98 3.39 
Turkey* 0.49 0.08 -0.95 3.00 
U.K.            6.11 3.64 -0.26 0.55 
* non-“high income” countries as defined by the World Economic Forum 
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Appendix D - Table 4. Descriptive statistics for states and host markets in Part 2 
 
 
Avg. 
Allocation 
Avg. 
Foreign 
Bias 
 
Optimal 
Weights 
Avg. 
Allocation 
Avg. Foreign Bias 
Arizona* 0.41 -0.65 Argentina 0.10 0.02 -1.14 
California* 0.33 -0.65 Australia 2.59 0.99 -0.56 
Colorado 0.43        -0.65 Austria        0.26 0.09 -0.52 
Connecticut 0.53 -0.65 Belgium 0.63 0.17 -0.72 
D.C. 0.70 -0.72 Brazil 2.36 0.58 -0.69 
Delaware 0.69 -0.66 Canada 3.97 2.01 -0.37 
Florida 0.54 -0.70 Colombia 0.35 0.01 -1.92 
Georgia 0.42 -0.64 Czech Republic 0.11 0.02 -0.86 
Iowa 1.10 -0.54 Denmark 0.48 0.22 -0.54 
Illinois 0.75 -0.60 Finland 0.41 0.21 -0.32 
Kansas 0.49 -0.68 France 4.23 1.70 -0.47 
Massachusetts 0.69 -0.65 Germany 3.23 1.29 -0.49 
Maryland 0.38 -0.62 Greece 0.21 0.06 -0.67 
Maine 0.49 -0.70 Hong Kong 4.87 0.81 -0.84 
Missouri 0.38 -0.60 Hungary 0.06 0.01 -0.79 
North 
Carolina 
0.68 -0.63 India 2.59 0.24 -1.14 
Nebraska 0.24 -0.53 Ireland 0.23 0.20 -0.24 
New 
Hampshire 
0.24 -0.63 Italy 1.36 0.48 -0.54 
New Jersey 0.34 -0.64 Japan 8.17 2.79 -0.53 
New Mexico 0.43 -0.67 Malaysia 0.78 0.07 -1.19 
New York 1.30 -0.58 Mexico 0.89 0.23 -0.67 
Ohio 0.53 -0.64 Netherlands 1.42 0.63 -0.43 
Pennsylvania 0.88 -0.54 New Zealand 0.10 0.04 -0.65 
Rhode Island 0.79 -0.63 Norway 0.53 0.36 -0.22 
Tennessee 0.55 -0.68 Philippines 0.33 0.06 -0.93 
Texas 1.72 -0.39 Portugal 0.17 0.03 -0.84 
Utah* 0.47 -0.66 Singapore 1.16 0.40 -0.59 
Virginia 0.43 -0.53 South Africa 1.67 0.20 -1.03 
Washington* 0.23 -0.68 South Korea 2.10 0.35 -0.84 
Wisconsin 0.97 -0.62     
 * Part of western state sub-sample (Hilary and Hui 2009) 
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Appendix E - Table 5. Main specification results for part 1 
 
Dependent variable is foreign bias as defined in the methodology section. Table has left-censored tobit 
regression results with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. Numbers in parentheses are 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.001, 0.01, and 0.5 
levels, respectively. The sample is from January 2006 to December 2015. 
 
Independent variables Base Model 
with 
Cultural 
Distance 
Developed 
host nations 
only 
Developing host 
nations only 
Home bias -0.044*** (0.001) 
-0.045*** 
(0.001) 
-2.33*** 
(0.018) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
Transaction costs -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.018*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Capital controls -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.047*** 
(0.001) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Stock market dev’t -0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.014*** 
(0.000) 
-0.913*** 
(0.006) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Tax levels -0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.073*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Five-year avg. GDP rate 0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
0.138*** 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Host is EU -0.009*** (0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.736*** 
(0.006) ‡ 
Host is NAFTA 0.099*** 
(0.002)] 
0.111*** 
(0.002) 
-0.476*** 
(0.015) 
-0.003*** 
(0.00) 
Host is Asean -0.071*** 
(0.000) 
-0.096*** 
(0.001) 
-2.63*** 
(0.022) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
Lagged one-year return 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Lagged three-year return 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Stock market volatility 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Common language 0.009*** (0.000) 
0.056*** 
(0.001) 
0.267*** 
(0.016) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
Shared common law -0.030*** 
(0.000) 
-0.032*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Geographic distance 0.061*** 
(0.001) 
0.069*** 
(0.001) 
-0.856*** 
(0.007) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
     
Cultural Distance  0.024*** (0.001) 
0.050** 
(0.002) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
     
N (number of left-censored 
observations) 56932 (1166456) 
56932 
(1166456) 
55512 
(828046) 1441 (338410) 
Chi-squared 13188.01*** 
 
14535.61**
* 
 
60425.40*** 
 
772.91*** 
 
Log likelihood -1435580.7 -1432096.9 -104476.56 -404498.01 
‡ = dummy variable omitted due to lack of representation in sub-sample 
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Appendix F - Table 6. Alternative specification results for part 1 
 
Independent variables Base Model 
with 
Cultural 
Distance 
Developed 
host nations 
only 
Developing host 
nations only 
Home bias 3.94*** (0.032) 
3.97*** 
(0.032) 
4.15*** 
(0.031) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
Credit* 0.065*** (0.000) 
0.067*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
FDI/GDP* 0.000 (0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
GDP(%)* 0.002** (0.000) 
-0.010*** 
(0.000) 
-0.014*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
GDP/capita* 1.31*** (0.012) 
1.29*** 
(0.012) 
-0.189*** 
(0.021) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Trade balance/GDP* -0.024*** (0.000) 
-0.023*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Transaction costs 0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.017*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
Capital controls -0.113*** 
(0.001) 
-0.111*** 
(0.001) 
-0.108*** 
(0.001) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Stock market dev’t -2.82*** 
(0.016) 
-2.66*** 
(0.016) 
-2.48*** 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Tax levels -0.279*** 
(0.001) 
-0.275*** 
 (0.001) 
-0.240*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Five-year avg. GDP rate 0.231*** 
(0.002) 
0.240*** 
(0.002) 
0.297*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Host is EU 0.054*** (0.010) 
0.150*** 
(0.010) 
-0.786*** 
(0.017) ‡ 
Host is NAFTA 1.01*** 
(0.045) 
1.33*** 
(0.047) 
-1.87*** 
(0.063) 
-0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Host is Asean 0.211*** 
(0.049) 
0.089* 
(0.042) 
-7.41*** 
(0.044) 
0.005** 
(0.001) 
Lagged one-year return 0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Lagged three-year return 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
Stock market volatility 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Common language 2.58*** (0.054) 
2.74*** 
(0.047) 
-7.4*** 
(0.075) 
-0.028*** 
(0.005) 
Shared common law -1.47*** 
(0.049) 
-1.29*** 
(0.042) 
8.71*** 
(0.075) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
Geographic distance -0.947*** 
(0.020) 
-0.701*** 
(0.021) 
-2.95*** 
(0.042) 
-0.011*** 
(0.001) 
Cultural Distance  0.248*** (0.005) 
0.230*** 
(0.005) 
-0.018*** 
(0.002) 
N (number of left-censored 
observations) 56932 (1166456) 
56932 
(1166456) 
55512 
(828046) 1420 (338410) 
Chi-squared 71507.62*** 
 
69901.72**
* 
 
63489.99*** 
 
787.83*** 
 
Log likelihood -139768.99 -138953.87 -126063.38 -410275.2 
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Appendix G - Table 7. Robustness tests for the alternative specification in part 1 
 
 Combined portfolio Developed markets Developing markets 
Panel A: Cultural Distance coefficients 
Main results from Table 4 0.248*** (0.005) 
0.230*** 
(0.005) 
-0.018*** 
(0.002) 
    
Updated Hofstede scores 0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.137*** 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
     (Tang and Koveos 
2008)  
 
 
Home and host mixed 
effects 0.059 · (0.032) 
.055* 
(0.027) -0.018 (0.026) 
OLS – zero-values 
excluded 0.102*** (0.007) 
0.190*** 
(0.008) ‡ 
OLS – with Heckman 0.067*** 
(0.000) 
0.068*** 
(0.000) 
-0.018*** 
(0.001) 
OLS – without Heckman 0.067*** 
(0.000) 
0.068*** 
(0.000) 
-0.018*** 
(0.001) 
Probit 0.237*** 
(0.005) 
0.279*** 
(0.005) ‡ 
Future-time reference 0.063*** 
(0.000) 
0.075*** 
(0.006) 
-0.033*** 
(0.004) 
Institutional quality 0.283*** 
(0.005) 
0.211*** 
(0.005) 
-0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Panel B : Coefficients of individual institutional quality components  
Efficiency 0.008*** (0.004) 
1.90*** 
(0.021) 
0.101*** 
(0.047) 
Rule of law -0.006*** 
(0.000) 
-1.30*** 
(0.032) 
-0.262*** 
(0.036) 
Corruption -0.045*** 
(0.000) 
0.061* 
(0.027) 
0.148*** 
(0.017) 
Expropriation -0.087*** 
(0.002) 
3.74*** 
(0.078) ‡ 
Contract law 0.120*** 
(0.001) 
-2.00*** 
(0.061) ‡ 
Panel C: Coefficients of individual cultural distance component 
dimensions  
Abs. difference - power 
distance 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.015*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
Abs. difference – 
individualism -0.005*** (0.000) 
-0.006*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
Abs. difference – 
masculinity -0.001*** (0.000) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
Abs. difference – 
uncertainty avoidance -0.000*** (0.000) 
0.001 · 
(0.000) ‡ 
‡ = variable omitted due to collinearity 
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Appendix H - Table 8. Main results for Part 2 
 
Independent variables Base Model Base Model with Religiosity Base Model with CP Ratio 
Home bias -0.044*** (0.001) 
0.043*** 
(0.001) 
0.092*** 
(0.002) 
Transaction costs -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Capital controls -0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Stock market dev’t -0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.031*** 
(0.000) 
Tax levels -0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.009*** 
(0.000) 
Five-year avg. GDP 
rate 0.007*** (0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.016*** 
(0.000) 
Host is EU -0.009*** (0.000) 
-0.008*** 
(0.000) 
-0.021*** 
(0.001) 
Host is NAFTA 0.099*** 
(0.002)] 
0.099*** 
(0.002) 
0.228*** 
(0.004) 
Host is Asean -0.071*** 
(0.000) 
-0.071*** 
(0.001) 
-0.163*** 
(0.002) 
Lagged one-year 
return 0.000*** (0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Lagged three-year 
return 0.000*** (0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Stock market volatility 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Common language 0.009*** (0.000) 
0.009*** 
(0.000) 
0.021*** 
(0.002) 
Shared common law -0.030*** 
(0.000) 
-0.030*** 
(0.000) 
-0.067*** 
(0.002) 
Geographic distance 0.061*** 
(0.001) 
0.061*** 
(0.001) 
0.139*** 
(0.002) 
    
Religiosity  -0.014*** (0.001)  
CP Ratio   0.008** (0.003) 
    
N (number of left-
censored observations) 56932 (1166456) 56932 (1166456) 56932 (1166456) 
Chi-squared 13188.01*** 
 
13196.22*** 
 
13103.00*** 
 
Log likelihood -1435580.7 -1435555.7 -1483054.6 
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Appendix I - Table 9. Robustness tests for part 2 
 
Robustness tests on foreign bias with modified specifications for religiosity and the CP ratio. Panel A adds 
additional variables to the main specifications, panel B uses alternative models, and Panel C uses religion-based 
sub-samples. Dependent variable is foreign bias as defined in the methodology section (log ratio of weighting of 
country i in fund holdings of host country j to the stock market capitalization weighting of country j). Table has left-
censored Tobit regression results with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. If a fund had zero market 
share for a country in a month of the time-series, the left-censored observations are the log of 0.001. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 0.001, 0.01, and 0.1 levels, respectively. The sample is from January 2006 
to December 2015. 
 
   
 Religiosity CP Ratio 
Main results from Table 4 -0.014*** (0.001) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
   
Institutional quality -0.016*** 
(0.001) 
0.041 
(0.27) 
Future-time reference -0.199*** 
(0.012) 
-0.053* 
(0.028) 
State-level collectivism -0.016*** 
(0.001) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
Cultural Distance -0.036*** 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
Alternative analytic methods    
Clustered standard errors -0.288** (0.139) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
Home and host country fixed 
effects 0.000 (0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Probit 0.120*** 
(0.023) 
0.003 
(0.019) 
OLS with Heckman control -0.014*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
OLS without Heckman control -0.014*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
OLS with zeros excluded -0.071*** 
(0.009) 
0.009 
(0.022) 
Sub-sample and decomposition   
Western state sub-sample -0.048 (0.051) ‡ 
   
Religiosity decomposition:   
  Protestants only 0.004* 
(0.002) - 
  Catholics only -0.006*** 
(0.001) - 
‡ entire Western state sub-sample had CP ratio higher than one. 
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Appendix J - Figure 1. Cultural distance and GDP/capita (sample) 
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Appendix K – Figure 2. Cultural distance and GDP/capita (BF) 
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Appendix L – Figure 3. Cultural distance and GDP/capita (population) 
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Appendix M – Figure 4. Creditworthiness and GDP/capita (sample) 
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Appendix N – Figure 5. Foreign Bias, Cultural distance, and GDP/Capita 
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Appendix O – Figure 6. Foreign Bias, Cultural distance, and Creditworthiness 
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Appendix P – Figure 7. Average level of religiosity by U.S. state for the sample (%) 
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Appendix Q – Figure 8. Average level of CP Ratio by U.S. state for the sample (%) 
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